Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, upon coming to power in Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution, adopted a distinctly Shia-sectarian constitution. With its approval, all Iranian citizens who did not belong to the Shia sect became, in practice, second-class citizens. At the same time, he embraced the export of the revolution beyond Iran through his “tilling the land” programme. To this day, the peoples of the region continue to suffer from the consequences of this programme. Among its bitter outcomes was the creation of ideologically driven Shia militias, which have caused significant bloodshed in several Arab countries.

Today, the Iranian regime is increasingly exposed amid the ongoing war with the United States-Israel alliance. What it had long concealed about its intentions towards the Arab Gulf states and the excess power it possesses has now been revealed. It has failed to respect the rights of neighbouring countries, targeting civilian sites and economic infrastructure in Gulf cities.

Gulf-Iranian relations are among the most complex issues in the regional system of the Middle East. The image of Iran in Gulf political, media, and intellectual discourse has been shaped by this ideological and military legacy, whose foundations were laid by Imam Khomeini and later translated into realities on the ground by Ali Khamenei. These relations have been defined by repeated military and security confrontations, as well as political positions viewed by Gulf Cooperation Council states as a direct threat to their security and sovereignty. Official and media discourse in the Gulf tends to portray Iran as a regional actor seeking to expand its political and military influence at the expense of neighbouring states and their peoples.

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Imam Khomeini left Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with three directives: killing Saddam Hussein, producing an atomic bomb, and occupying Mecca and Medina. These directives have deepened the crisis within the system of Guardianship of the Jurist. While Iran ultimately saw the execution of Hussein, its continued pursuit of the other two directives has placed it in a regional and international dilemma. Iran’s programme of exporting the revolution and establishing armed Shia militias in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen over the past four decades, while funding and directing them, has brought it into direct conflict with regional countries, especially the Gulf states. Likewise, its pursuit of a nuclear programme has placed it in sustained confrontation with the international community.

Iran’s regional network of armed groups reflects this strategy clearly. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is not merely a party but a “super-state” that takes its orders from beyond its borders; in Yemen, the Houthis are not a Yemeni national project but a tool to export Iranian national security to the borders of Saudi Arabia and threaten navigation in the Red Sea; in Iraq, Iran has established Shia militias to which the state itself defers; and in Arab Ahvaz, demographic change and the destruction of Arab palm trees are carried out in the name of Persian national security.

The project introduced by Khomeini is not an Islamic project, even if it employs Islam to serve it. It is a new imperial project, driven by Persian ambitions, using religion as both cover and driving force. Khamenei is considered the true heir to the 1979 revolution and the continuation of this ideological project in all its dimensions.

Khomeini developed the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, which did not exist in Shia doctrine before he came to power. Under this theory, Ali Khamenei, and after him Mojtaba Khamenei, acts as the “Guardian Jurist” on behalf of the hidden imam and receives directives from him directly. The Guardian Jurist is not merely a religious concept but a political, security, and military authority, leading an axis of followers across the region and pursuing a project of dominance at both regional and international levels. The “scorched earth” approach is one manifestation of this imam-centred project.

The supreme leader is also a religious authority within the Shia sect, surrounded by an aura of sanctity among Twelver Shia believers. The assassination of Ali Khamenei would therefore mean the loss of a central pillar of the Wilayat al-Faqih system.

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Ali Khamenei oversaw Iran’s nuclear programme, missile capabilities, space programme, and regional influence, including figures such as Qassem Soleimani. The killing of Khamenei would close a major chapter of revolutionary logic in Iran and push the state towards a retaliatory path. Iran has already sought to prepare for this by accelerating allegiance to his son Mojtaba, although he does not possess his father’s charisma or influence. Iran before Khamenei will not be the same as Iran after him.

Iran’s dilemma in war

Western media coverage has portrayed Iran as a central actor in regional instability, focusing on its military capabilities, support for armed groups, and nuclear and missile programmes. These narratives have reinforced the image of Iran as a destabilising force and contributed to a climate in which the current war between the US-Israel alliance and Iran is accepted by Western public opinion.

The 2019 attacks on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia marked a turning point in Gulf discourse on Iran. Gulf leaders viewed them as a direct threat to regional and global energy security. These events reinforced perceptions of an Iranian threat and pushed Gulf states to strengthen military and security cooperation with regional and international partners.

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most important strategic maritime passages, with about 20 percent of global oil trade passing through it. It is the main artery for exporting oil and gas from the Gulf to global markets, particularly Asia. If Iran were to close the strait or disrupt navigation, exports would be halted, global prices would rise sharply, and major economic disruption would follow, including inflation, financial instability, and slower growth. Food supply chains in Gulf countries would also be affected.

Such a move would provide internationally acceptable justification for the US to form a military coalition to protect navigation, potentially including the occupation of Iran’s Kharg Island. Gulf states would also be compelled to expand security cooperation and strengthen maritime defence capabilities.

Iran faces a complex military dilemma. It does not possess a modern air force capable of sustaining a prolonged conventional war against the US or Israel. Instead, it relies on ballistic missiles, drones, and asymmetric warfare, which serve as tools of deterrence rather than decisive victory. It also depends on proxy warfare through groups such as Hezbollah and militias in Iraq.

The Houthis remain a key escalation factor. Their entry into the war would depend on a decision by the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to which they are subordinate. If the US were to forcefully reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis could attempt to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait as a final escalation step.

Iran avoids direct war because its infrastructure is vulnerable to precision strikes, its nuclear facilities are exposed, and its economy cannot withstand prolonged conflict. It therefore follows a strategy of escalation without direct war, relying on indirect pressure through its regional network, while the US-Israel alliance seeks to draw it into confrontation.

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Iran’s dilemma in peace

Politically, Iran faces a degree of international isolation under Western sanctions. Its allies, Russia and China, do not want to engage in direct war with the West on its behalf. Despite some improvement in relations with Gulf states following the 2023 Beijing agreement with Saudi Arabia, Gulf states continue to rely on the US for security.

Internally, Iran faces recurring protests, a legitimacy crisis, divisions between reformists and hardliners, and opposition from secular and independent currents. Economic sanctions have led to inflation, currency depreciation, and reduced investment. Iran operates a war economy with limited capacity, relying on unofficial oil sales and discounted exports, particularly to China.

At the same time, Iran seeks to achieve rapid deterrence through missiles, drones, and its regional proxies, while signalling nuclear capability. This increases the likelihood of preemptive strikes and exposes it to multiple fronts.

Iran is therefore caught in three dilemmas: strong deterrence but weak war-fighting capability; wide regional influence but limited economic resources; and an escalation strategy that risks turning into a full-scale war it seeks to avoid. It pursues sustained pressure below the threshold of war, seeking to exhaust its adversaries without entering direct confrontation.

For Iran, victory in this confrontation means the survival of the Islamic republic. It considers US military bases in the region legitimate targets, arguing that it cannot strike the US directly. This has extended to the targeting of Gulf economic infrastructure, embassies, and hotels, on the grounds that they host a US or Israeli presence. This has created a clear gap between what the political leadership declares and what the IRGC carries out in practice.

The Gulf at a crossroads

The Arab Gulf states now stand at a crossroads. In response to Iranian missiles and drones targeting civilian and economic sites, they have strengthened their air defence capabilities through systems such as Patriot and THAAD, intercepting many of these attacks before they reach their targets. They have also expanded security partnerships with countries such as Pakistan and Turkiye.

However, Gulf states do not seek an open war. If escalation continues and crosses critical thresholds, they may be forced to move beyond defence towards preventive military action to neutralise threats before they reach their cities.

If Iran retains sufficient capability, it may attempt to target or even occupy Gulf territories and islands, leading to a dangerous escalation with unpredictable consequences. The region would then face a conflict with consequences that cannot be controlled.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.