Ever since Donald Trump declared that he could end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours”, much of the world has been waiting to see whether he could force Moscow and Kyiv into a settlement. Millions of views and scrolls, miles of news feeds and mountains of forecasts have been burned on that question.

Trump fed this expectation by insisting that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was running out of options and would eventually have to accept his deal. In reality, the opposite is true. It is Trump who has no leverage. He can threaten Nicolas Maduro with potential military action in or around Venezuela, but he has no influence over Vladimir Putin. Any sanctions harsh enough to damage Russia would also hit the wider Western economy, and there is not a single leader in the West willing to saw off the branch they are sitting on.

Armed intervention is even more implausible. From the first days of the full-scale invasion, NATO decided to support Ukraine with weapons and training while avoiding steps that could trigger a direct NATO–Russia war. That position has not changed.

As a result, Ukraine has been left in a position where, with or without sufficient support from its allies, it is in effect fighting Russia alone. All talk of peace or a ceasefire has proved to be a bluff, a way for Vladimir Putin to buy time and regroup. Putin’s strategy relies on outlasting not only Ukraine’s army but also the patience and political unity of its allies. The United States has now circulated a revised version of its peace framework, softening some of the most contentious points after consultations with Kyiv and several European governments. Yet the Kremlin continues to demand major territorial concessions and the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces. Without this, Russia says it will not halt its advance. Ukraine, for its part, maintains that it will not surrender territory.

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Once it became clear that the diplomatic track offered no breakthrough, the United States all but halted arms deliveries to Ukraine. Officials blamed the federal government shutdown, although the real cause was unlikely to be a shortage of movers at the Pentagon. Either way, American military assistance has dwindled to a trickle, consisting mostly of supplies approved under the Biden administration. At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary-designate Austin Dahmer said: “I’m not aware of any pause in [US military] aid to Ukraine.” It sounded less like a serious assessment and more like an admission of ignorance. Every Ukrainian soldier can feel the consequences of the sharp reduction in American weapons. Every resident of Kyiv and other cities can feel the shortage of air defence systems.

Europe has not filled the gap. The European Union’s defence industry and joint-procurement schemes have produced many promises but little real money. A few billion euros have been formally committed and far less has been delivered. Member states prefer to rearm themselves first and Ukraine second, although their own programmes are moving slowly. The EU remains divided between governments willing to take greater risks to support Kyiv and others that fear provoking Russia or weakening their own budgets. Brussels is now pushing a plan to use frozen Russian assets to back a loan of up to 140 billion euros ($162bn) for Ukraine, which could support Kyiv’s budget and defence spending over the next two years. Several key member states that host most of those reserves remain cautious, and without unanimity, the plan may stall.

This leaves Ukraine expanding its own production and fighting with whatever arrives and whatever is not siphoned off by corrupt figures such as Tymur Mindich, who is under investigation in a major procurement case. For now, Ukraine can slow the enemy at enormous cost, but this is nowhere near enough to win.

The army is under-supplied. The government has failed to sustain motivation or mobilise the country; in fact, it has achieved the opposite. Men are fighting their fourth year of war, while women cannot wait indefinitely. Divorces are rising, exhaustion is deepening, and morale is collapsing. Prosecutors have opened more than 255,000 cases for unauthorised absence and more than 56,000 for desertion since 2022. In the first 10 months of 2025 alone, they registered around 162,500 AWOL cases and 21,600 desertion cases. Other reports suggest that more than 21,000 troops left the army in October, which is the highest monthly figure so far. Social injustice is widening.

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Demographically, the picture is equally bleak. Ukraine’s population has fallen from more than 50 million at independence to about 31 million in territory controlled by Kyiv as of early 2025. Births remain below deaths and fertility rates have dropped to about one child per woman.

Against this backdrop, Ukraine is left with three strategic options.

The first option is to accept Putin’s terms. This would mean capitulating, losing political face and giving up territory, but it would preserve a Ukrainian state. It would also lock the country into long-term vulnerability.

The second option is a radical overhaul of Ukraine’s political and military leadership. This would involve rebuilding mobilisation, restructuring the command system and re-engineering the war effort from the ground up. Ukraine cannot fight a long war with institutions that were designed for peacetime politics and rotational deployments.

The third option is to change nothing and maintain the status quo. Ukraine would continue launching precision strikes on Russian oil infrastructure in the hope of grinding down the Kremlin’s economy and waiting for Putin to die. This is an illusion. If such strikes could not break a smaller Ukraine, they will not break a country many times larger in economic, territorial and demographic terms. Damage will be inflicted, but nowhere near enough to force Russia to stop.

Judging by recent statements from Zelenskyy and several of his European partners, Ukraine has effectively committed itself to the third option. The question is how long this approach can be sustained. Even setting aside morale and exhaustion after four years of war, the financial outlook is bleak. Ukraine faces a vast budget deficit and public debt that is likely to exceed 100 percent of gross domestic product. Europe has failed to assemble the necessary funds, Belgium has not released frozen Russian assets and economic growth across much of the continent remains weak. Any significant increase in support would require political courage at a time when voters remain sensitive to the recent inflation surge. The EU is also unable to tie the United States to long-term commitments in the current political climate in Washington.

All this leads to an unavoidable conclusion. If Ukraine intends to survive as a state, it will eventually have to take the second path and undertake a radical restructuring of its political and military leadership. Once that moment arrives, Moscow’s terms will be harsher than they are now. The Russian ultimatum is likely to expand from claims on four regions to demands for eight, along with strict control mechanisms, demilitarisation and further concessions.

Radical change is needed immediately, before Ukraine’s strategic options narrow further and before its ability to resist collapses with them.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.